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The Somme and PasschendaeleField Marshal Sir Douglas Haig was Commander-in-chief of the British Army on the Western Front from December 1915 until the end of the First World War. Douglas Haig believed in the 'Big Push'. He was convinced that the enemy could be overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers, and that final victory could only be achieved on the Western Front. Haig continually demanded more and more men from the politicians and refused to allow any troops to be diverted to other areas of fighting. Haig originally intended to fight his first major battle near Ypres in 1916, but he was forced to change his plans after the German attack on Verdun, which began in February 1916. Instead, on 1 July 1916, Haig launched his first great battle began along the banks of the river Somme. This was an attempt to take pressure off the French at Verdun, but it proved to be a disaster. Haig had ordered a seven day bombardment involving 4,000 guns, which was intended to destroy the German positions. But bombardment failed to destroy the enemy defences and the British suffered 59,000 casualties on the first day. There were a number of reasons why the attack failed. The German trenches were very well constructed and offered very effective protection from gun-fire. They were dug deep into the chalk and this allowed the German troops to emerge virtually unscathed when the bombardment stopped. One of the mines that were dug under the German positions was exploded ten minutes early and allowed to the Germans time to prepare. Despite the failures and the horrifying casualties, Haig ordered the attacks to continue, but progress was slow. Pozieres was five kilometres from the start line. Haig had expected to capture it on the first day. In fact it was no taken until 25 August after very bitter fighting and very heavy casualties in the Australian units that were ordered to attack. By then, the town had been almost completely destroyed. Much the same story was repeated elsewhere. Instead of a sweeping victory, the Allies were forced to fight every inch of the way. When Haig eventually called off the attack in November, less than five miles had been gained. In Haig's defence. It is true that he had only about half the forces that he believed he needed, but on the other hand, he allowed the army to go on attacking long after it was clear that no real progress was being made. At the same time, the French on the British right made much more impressive advances. In 1917 Haig ordered a second major attack at Passchendaele, just north of Ypres. The aim was to capture the Passchendaele ridge and then capture the U-Boat pens at Zeebrugge. He had been encouraged by the success of the battle of Messines Ridge, east of Ypres, in June 1917, when eighteen mines were exploded under the German lines. But the Germans had defended the Passchendaele ridge with 2,000 concrete machine-gun posts. However, it was the mud that defeated the British attackers. Throughout the battle it rained heavily and the bombardment destroyed the drains and ditches that crossed the low-lying ground. Haig and his aides never visited the battle-field and were unaware as to how bad the conditions were. When the British advanced they needed duck-boards laid across the mud and ribbons to show them where the safe ground was. This time four miles were gained in three months, across a battlefield that was a sea of mud. Haig has often been criticised for the heavy losses that he incurred in his big battles. He appears to have been inflexible and lacking in new ideas, but so were most commanders in the Great War. He remained convinced until the end of the war that cavalry was the key to victory. Haig also resisted Lloyd George's attempts to create a unified Allied Command in 1917, but was forced to accept Foch as his superior in 1918. Haig's tactics of the 'Big Push' failed. In 1918, victory was one by surprise attacks without massive bombardments.
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